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I. INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in the field of tender offers have made it one of the most
dynamic fields of corporation law today. Each new major takeover attempt seems to
be an evolutionary step, the result of the innovation and creativity of the professionals
involved. Rather than analyzing or criticizing the recent highly publicized battles,
however, this Article addresses a subject of even greater importance: the implications
of these developments for tender offer regulation in general, and a recent assessment
of the regulatory framework provided in the Report of the SEC Advisory Committee
on Tender Offers.'
On February 25, 1983, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) es-
tablished the Advisory Committee to review the effectiveness of current takeover
laws in regulating newly devised acquisition practices.2 In July of the same year the
Committee issued its Report, which contained fifty recommendations for action by
the SEC or Congress. A detailed analysis of each of the fifty recommendations is
beyond the scope of this Article.3 Instead, this Article examines the Committee's
general approach to solving the problems of the current regulatory system, discusses
a few of its more significant recommendations, and highlights some of the major
problems left unresolved by the Committee. The author's aim is to bring into focus
some of the fundamental questions left unanswered in the area of tender offer
regulation--questions that must be answered if any change in takeover regulation is
to achieve the Committee's desired goals.
II. FEDERAL REGULATION: A PATCHWORK QUILT
A casual browse through the federal regulatory scheme of tender offers reveals
two curious characteristics. First, despite the recent emergence of the tender offer as
the dominant means of acquisition, federal regulation in the tender offer area relates
solely to disclosure issues and to the mechanics of purchasing the shares.4 Since
federal law provides no normative rules governing the role or obligation of directors
* Partner, Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton, Washington, D.C. The author formerly served as director of the
Division of Corporation Finance and as general counsel of the Securities and Exchange Commission.
1. SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, Report of Recommendations (July 8, 1983), reprinted in FED. SeC.
L. REP. (CCH) No. 1028 (extra ed.) (July 15, 1983) [hereinafter cited as Advisory Committee Report].
2. See SEC Release No. 34-19,528, 48 Fed. Reg. 9111 (1983).
3. See generally Greene & Junewiez, A Reappraisal of Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U.
PENN. L. REv. 647 (1984).
4. See Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(f) (1982); see also Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership, H.R.
REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1968); Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate
Takeover Bids, S. RPP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
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of either the bidder or the target during a takeover, it appears that state law was
intended to fill the void.
The second curious characteristic is that federal regulation of tender offers
consists of an odd joinder of a very simple governing statute5 and a host of complex
and sometimes conflicting rules promulgated under it.6 The number and complexity
of the SEC's rules are a direct result of the radical and unanticipated changes that
have occurred in the tender offer area over the past decade. Fifteen years ago, when
the basic regulatory framework was established, tender offers were conducted by
corporate outsiders and were largely unregulated by the states. Since then, however,
acquisition by tender offer has emerged as the preferred method in both hostile and
negotiated transactions. This evolution has forced the SEC to assume a more active
regulatory role.
The SEC had two regulatory methods from which to choose a response to this
evolution. The SEC could have developed broad federal principles of fair conduct
applicable to all aspects of the takeover process, or it could have adopted limited rules
tailored to known transactions. The latter approach was chosen, probably because of
a belief that aggressive constituents of SEC regulation would frustrate the spirit of
any broad principles developed, and that state regulation of most aspects of acquisi-
tions had been sufficient in the past and would continue to be so.
This choice and the resulting regulatory scheme are open to criticism for two
reasons. First, the current regulatory scheme does not respond to the modem realities
of tender offers. Fifteen years ago, federal regulation of the purchase stage and state
regulation of all other matters may have been adequate because few people even
knew what a tender offer was. Today, however, tender offers are the major acquisi-
tion technique. We should not continue to use this outdated approach to regulation.
Multi-million and billion dollar transactions that crisscross the country and some-
times the globe should not be regulated in part by a federal disclosure statute and in
part by laws of one of the fifty states.
The second criticism accepts the existence of this federal/state framework and
instead focuses on the problems relating to the SEC's hole-plugging technique of
regulation. Since, in the few areas the SEC does regulate, the Commission has
rejected the path of regulation by broad guiding principles, the SEC has been forced
to react to changes in tender offer practices instead of anticipating them.7 This
patchwork style of federal regulation, though admittedly effective in the short term, is
inappropriate in the constantly changing field of modem takeovers. The inherently
dynamic nature of the area, coupled with the endless creativity and ingenuity of
bidders and targets, renders obsolete the SEC's responses to abuses almost before
they are conceived.
A good illustration is provided by the SEC's reactions to the tender offer prora-
tion issue. In 1979 the SEC adopted an elaborate set of rules governing various
5. See Williams Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
6. See 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-240.14e (1984).
7. In this regard the author is also critical of himself. These rules were adopted during his tenure as Director of the
SEC's Division of Corporation Finance, and he never called for a different approach. The thoughts presented here have
evolved since then.
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aspects of tender offers. s These rules were designed in part to establish uniform
minimum time periods for tender offers so that shareholders would have an adequate
response time, and in part to preempt certain state regulation.9 The most significant
changes provided in the 1979 rules were (1) to require tender offers to remain open
for a period of twenty business days, (2) to allow shareholders to withdraw their
shares during the first fifteen days, and (3) to require bidders formally to commence
their offers within five days of having publicly announced the terms.
The 1979 changes, however, did not include a change conforming the rules
governing proration to the new time periods. Under the proration rules, if a bidder
made a partial offer that was oversubscribed, the bidder was required only to pur-
chase on a pro rata basis the shares tendered during the first ten calendar days. After
the ten calendar day period, the bidder could purchase on a first-come, first-served
basis if the offer was not initially oversubscribed. Therefore, if shareholders did not
immediately tender in response to a partial bid, they ran the risk of having only a
smaller percentage or none of their shares purchased. Bidders took advantage of the
different time periods by developing two-tier bids. The first tier was a tender offer in
which the price per share was significantly higher than the price that was provided in
the second tier merger which was to follow. If the shareholders did not tender within
the first ten days of the offer (missing the opportunity to have all of their shares
included in the proration pool), they would receive a lower average price per share.
This mismatching of time periods created high front-end, low back-end transactions
similar to "Saturday Night Specials," which were started on a Friday afternoon and
completed seven days later, even though the first tier tender offer technically re-
mained open for twenty business days. In response to the pressure placed on smaller
shareholders by this practice, the SEC tinkered with the rules again in 1982 by
adopting a provision that requires proration throughout the tender offer."° Although
two-tier pricing is still permissible, the possibility that small shareholders will be
excluded from the first, higher priced tier is lessened when the time for tender is
effectively extended.
This series of SEC rule changes illustrates the Commission's reactive approach
to tender offer regulation. Concerns raised by this approach, combined with the rapid
change in the complexion of tender offer offenses and defenses, led to the appoint-
ment of the Advisory Committee.'1 Unfortunately, as is discussed below, the Com-
mittee continued this tinkering approach, eliminating some abuses while perpetuating
the need for piecemeal regulation.
III. ADVISORY COMMITTEE: GOOD IDEA, BAD PLANNING, MIXED RESULTS
The SEC Advisory Committee was to review the effectiveness of the current
regulatory scheme and to make recommendations for legislative and regulatory
changes that would benefit shareholders of all corporations, not just those of target
8. See 44 Fed. Reg. 70,341 (1979) (codified at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-3 to .14d-4 (1984)).
9. See id.
10. See 47 Fed. Reg. 57,680 (1982) (codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-8 (1984)).
11. The Committee was established in accordance with the provisions of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, as
amended. 5 U.S.C. App. §§ 1-15 (1982).
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companies. 2 The Committee consisted of eighteen prominent merger and acquisition
specialists drawn from the business community, academia, and the legal and account-
ing professions. 13 On July 15, 1983, the Committee issued its report that contained
fifty recommendations for action. 14
A. Advisory Committee's Approach
The Advisory Committee fulfilled its role in some areas and ducked it in other
areas. On the positive side, the Committee made some very useful recommendations
to help curb abuses in takeover tactics. The Committee's useful recommendations are
discussed below. 15 However, the overall approach taken by the Committee is subject
to some criticism. The major disappointment is that because the SEC was asking for
advice, the Committee assumed it was to respond within the existing structure and
framework of the governing federal statute, the Williams Act. 16 While the general
public may have expected a broad policy analysis because of the controversy sur-
rounding tender offers, the Committee viewed its task as helping the SEC improve
the existing system.
The problem with the Committee's approach is that while the SEC may claim to
be neutral in any particular contest, the Williams Act injects a certain target-
shareholder bias into tender offer regulation. The Act was designed specifically to
protect target company shareholders by ensuring that they would have certain in-
formation concerning a tender offer and a certain amount of time in which to act. 17
This regulatory scheme, by precluding bidders from acting as quickly and as furtively
as they would like, displays a preference for the shareholders of a target over those of
a bidder. This preference, in turn, decreases the speed and certainty with which
bidders can make successful tender offers. And because time is money and un-
certainty costs resources, the current regulatory approach discourages possible bid-
ders and therefore reduces the number of takeovers.
Because it takes its lead from the Williams Act, the SEC properly focuses its
regulatory attention in takeover matters on target rather than bidder shareholders.
Moreover, because of its understanding of the Williams Act mandate, the SEC
concentrates its efforts on protecting smaller, less sophisticated target shareholders
12. See SEC Release No. 34-19,528, 48 Fed. Reg. 9111 (1983).
13. The members were Dean LeBaron, President of Batterymareh Financial Management, who was selected as
Chair of the Committee; Jeffrey B. Bartell, Esq., of Quarles & Brady; Michael D. Dingman, President of the Signal
Companies, Inc.; Frank H. Easterbrook, of the University of Chicago Law School; Joseph H. Flom, Esq., of Skadden,
Arps, Slate, Meagher & Fom; the Honorable Arthur J. Goldberg; Robert F. Greenhill, Managing Director of Morgan
Stanley & Co., Inc.; Ray J. Groves, Chair and Chief Executive of Ernst & Whinney; Alan R. Gruber, Chair and Chief
Executive Officer of Orion Capital Corporation; Edward L. Hennessey, Jr., Chair of the Board of Allied Corporation;
Gregg A. Jarrell, Senior Economist of Lexecon, Inc.; Robert P. Jensen, Chair and Chief Executive Officer of E. F. Hutton
LBO, Inc.; Martin Lipton, Esq., of Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz; Robert E. Rubin, of Goldman, Sachs & Co.; Irwin
Schneiderman, Esq., of Cahill, Gordon & Reindel; John W. Spurdle, Jr., Senior Vice President of Morgan Guaranty
Trust Company of New York; Jeff C. Tarr, Managing Partner of Junction Partners; and Bruce Wasserstein, Managing
Director of the First Boston Corporation.
14. Advisory Committee Report, supra note 1.
15. See infra notes 19-29 and accompanying text.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)-(f) (1982).
17. See Susquehanna Corp. v. Pan Am. Sulphur Co., 423 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1970); H.R. Rv. No. 1711, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEws 2812.
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rather than professionals, who are considered to be in a better position to control their
exposure to risk. Not surprisingly, therefore, most of the SEC's rules in this area are
aimed at providing these smaller target shareholders sufficient time to consider an
offer and enabling them to obtain the highest possible price. 1 8 Such a scheme,
however, lacks a guiding principle that can indicate when the SEC has sufficiently
regulated tender offers. Furthermore, the Advisory Committee Report provides no
indication or comment on how the proper regulatory balance should be struck. The
problem is compounded by the SEC's apparent inability to regulate the conduct of
directors of either the bidder or the target companies-it can protect only the target
shareholders.
Because the Advisory Committee worked within the framework of the current
system, its Report contains no real surprises and no suggestion for a fundamental
reallocation of regulatory power. However, simply to state the result is to gloss over
an increasingly important problem: there is no consensus regarding what directors
should do when faced with a tender offer and what role target shareholders should
play in authorizing or approving directors' responses.
B. Advisory Committee's Specific Results
Despite their shortcomings, the Advisory Committee's recommendations, at
least in the context of tinkering, are comprehensive and sound. The most significant
change recommended by the Committee calls for Congress and the SEC to adopt
rules prohibiting the use of charter or bylaw provisions to erect blockades against
changes in control.' 9 In the alternative, the Committee suggested a rather ingenious
approach: companies should be required to adopt supermajority provisions by the
same vote percentage that is contained in the proposed supermajority provisions
themselves. The Committee also advised that a regulation be imposed requiring these
blocking provisions to be ratified by shareholder vote every three years.
20
Another laudible recommendation was aimed at putting democracy back into the
corporate governance system. The Committee recommended that certain matters
relating to change of control be presented to the shareholders for nonbinding advisory
vote. These matters would include supermajority provisions, disenfranchisement,
standstill agreements, and change of control bail-out provisions (such as golden
parachutes)."1 Thus, even though their vote would not be binding on the corporation,
the shareholders would have an opportunity to vent their anger--or spout their
praise.22
The Advisory Committee also proposed a list of specific recommendations in
response to some of the abusive defensive maneuvers that have evolved. For in-
stance, the Committee would prohibit target management from adopting change of
18. See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14d-240.14e (1984).
19. Advisory Committee Report, supra note 1, Recommendation 35, at 36.
20. Id., Recommendation 36, at 36-37.
21. Id., Recommendation 37, at 37.
22. But cf. Separate Statement of Frank H. Easterbrook and Gregg A. Jarrell, Advisory Committee Report, supra
note 1, at 104: "Opinion polls are far less effective than real elections in eliciting the true position of the electorate."
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control compensation agreements (for example, granting golden parachutes) if a
tender offer for the company had commenced. 23 Also, to provide a check when target
management negotiates special agreements aimed at courting a friendly bidder, the
Advisory Committee suggested that any issuance of more than fifteen percent of a
target company's stock during a tender offer must be approved by the shareholders. 24
The Committee's most important proposal regarding open market purchases
involves acquisitions of stock (other than from an issuer) that would give an acquiror
more than twenty percent ownership of a company. 25 The proposal would require that
qualifying acquisitions be done by a tender offer to all shareholders. 2 6 This
recommendation was specifically designed to address so-called "creeping" tender
offers. 27
Finally, the Committee's recommendations would work to discourage "green-
mail" schemes. A greenmail scheme exists when an investor buys a significant block
of a company's stock on the open market and then announces a desire to be bought
out by the company at a premium. If the target management balks, the greenmailer
will threaten to mount a proxy fight or launch a tender offer to gain control of the
company and liquidate it. 28 The Committee suggested that target companies be pro-
hibited from repurchasing their own stock at a premium unless the stock has been
held for at least two years or the target's shareholders have approved the
repurchase.
29
C. Unanswered Questions
Despite these significant steps forward, the Advisory Committee avoided
serious issues in other areas. Most importantly, the Committee accepted without
comment the notion that federal regulation should continue to govern disclosure
issues and to regulate the conduct of the bidder, while state law should govern the
legitimacy of the actions of the target company and its board.3" It is not altogether
clear, nor did the Committee explain, why such a bifurcated system with its inherent
problems and inconsistencies should continue to exist after two decades of experi-
ence.
Because the Committee failed to scrutinize the wisdom of a bifurcated system,
many of the Committee's recommendations only serve to stretch the system at both
ends, leaving a dearth of reasoning at its core. On the one hand, for example, the
23. Advisory Committee Report, supra note 1, Recommendation 38, at 40-41.
24. Id., Recommendation 41, at 44.
25. Id., Recommendation 14, at 23.
26. Id.
27. Creeping tender offers exploit the fact that no clear definition of "tender offer" exists in the regulatory scheme.
Currently, bidders can acquire a significant interest in a target through open market purchases without being required to
make disclosure until after the fact by filing a schedule 13D. Since these bidders technically are not making a tender offer,
they are not prevented from buying shares in spite of an announced tender offer, and therefore they can purchase from
selling shareholders on a first-come, first-served basis.
28. Although there has been litigation challenging the initial acquisition stage, see, e.g., Dan River, Inc. v. lcahn,
701 F.2d 278 (4th Cir. 1983), and the repurchase demand stage, see, e.g., Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556 (Del. Ch.
1977), each stage has usually survived attack.
29. Advisory Committee Report, supra note 1, Recommendation 43, at 46.
30. See id., Recommendation 33, at 34.
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Committee adopted without significant comment or analysis the state "business
judgment" concept as the sole standard by which to appraise directors' conduct
during the course of a takeover.3 1 On the other hand, the Advisory Committee
recommended that laws be passed to prohibit certain golden parachutes, shark repel-
lants, issuances of a company's stock in the midst of a takeover, 32 counter tender
offers as a response to any and all bids (the "Pac-Man defense"), 33 and repurchases
of securities.34 Each of these actions has been protected in the past under the state
business judgment rule, which made each action unchallengeable if the directors
acted in good faith and for any rational business purpose. 35 The business judgment
rule itself has fostered the development of the various tactics the Committee now
wants to eliminate as impermissible impediments to takeovers in general. The Com-
mittee provides no guidance as to why the line is drawn here. Further, no criteria is
provided to judge how far directors of targets should be able to go in developing new
techniques to tie up the target company. 36
Also, although the Committee chose to address some of the problems spawned
by the business judgment rule, it failed entirely to acknowledge what is perhaps one
of the greatest ironies that characterizes this area. Because a target's response to a
hostile takeover will pass legal muster if there is any rational business purpose for it,
the invariable response of a target's board is a claim that the opening bid is in-
adequate. Yet conventional wisdom holds that many if not most shareholders would
be willing to accept the bidder's premium above the market price despite the board's
claims of inadequacy.
It is arguable that such a response by a board is necessary. Shareholders of major
publicly held companies may be assumed to be powerless to act or negotiate and will
therefore accept any premium offered because of a fear of missing out. But one could
also argue that shareholders. should be permitted to evaluate the board's analysis and
recommendation and vote for themselves, particularly when actions taken by board
members may in part be motivated by a reluctance to yield their positions to an
uninvited bidder.
The heart of the problem is a lack of analysis by the Committee of the roles of
directors and shareholders in an acquisition scheme. But even here the Committee is
perhaps not entirely to blame. Without a clear consensus in the business and share-
holder communities as to what the role of directors should be, it is difficult to draw
regulatory lines that delineate when directors have gone too far. To its credit, the
Advisory Committee seemed to agree with the general notion that shareholders'
current checks on the board (their ability to vote and to sell their shares) are
inadequate-hence the recommended "advisory vote., 37 But without an understand-
31. Id.
32. See supra notes 19-20, 23-24 and accompanying text.
33. Advisory Committee Report, supra note 1, Recommendation 40, at 43.
34. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 43-62 and accompanying text.
36. See, e.g., Greene & Junewicz, Piecemeal Reform Suggested by Tender Offer Bill, Legal Times, Aug. 20, 1984,
at I1, 22, for a discussion of the strategy employed in Carter Hawley Hale's attempt to defeat a hostile tender offer.
37. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
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ing of the role target shareholders should play in the tender offer process, even this
recommendation may raise more questions than it answers.
IV. CURRENT SCHEME: WHERE, How, AND WHY
The lack of analysis concerning the proper role for directors and shareholders in
a takeover bid, combined with the Committee's strong endorsement of the business
judgment rule, will put increasing pressure on the courts to set new policy in this
area. The courts, however, are ill-equipped to meet this demand, primarily because
the courts' only analytical tool-the business judgment rule as construed under state
law-was not designed to apply to a target board's decision to fight a tender offer.
Initially, federal law (in addition to state law) was thought to apply to a target's
board reaction to a hostile tender offer. 38 The holdings of Santa Fe Industries v.
Green39 and its progeny,4" however, drastically limit a plaintiffs ability to invoke
federal antifraud provisions to challenge a board's decision. In Santa Fe, the United
States Supreme Court held that minority shareholders did not state a claim under
federal securities law by alleging that the terms of a proposed merger were inherently
unfair. Although it is true that a few federal courts recently have tried to breathe a
federal regulatory interest into the target's response, 41 these courts are a small minor-
ity and are likely to remain so.
It is clear, therefore, that the exclusive source of law under which the actions of
directors are appraised is the law of the state of incorporation. This means that a
target's decision to accept or reject an offer, make a counter bid, or throw the wealth
of the company into an attempt to defeat the offer is evaluated solely under state law.
State law also provides the gauge by which to test the validity of techniques used by
the board to fend off hostile tender offers, such as golden parachute agreements and
charter amendments.
The major problem encountered when state law is relied on, however, is that
state statutes are silent in the context of hostile bids. Indeed, state statutes seem to
reflect a legislative assumption that hostile bids never occur. As a result, the courts
have had to devise the applicable standards for these cases. Most courts, after review-
ing the existing case law, have selected the business judgment rule."2
A. Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule, although articulated in various ways in different
jurisdictions, in general bestows a presumption of sound business judgment on the
38. See, e.g., Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1163 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see also
Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. Rzp. (CCH) 95,863 (C.D.
Cal. Nov. 29, 1976).
39. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
40. See, e.g., In re Sunshine Mining Co. See. Litig., 496 F. Supp. 9 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Berman v. Gerber Prods.
Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978).
41. See, e.g., Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1982); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209,
215 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
42. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981);
Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980).
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board of directors. The board and managers are presumed to act in good faith, and
their decision on a particular issue will not be disturbed if any rational business
purpose can be found to support it.
4 3
The rule was born and raised in the context of reviewing third party transactions
structured and effected so as to maximize corporate profits. In this context the logic
of the rule is compelling. Directors' decisions should be given great deference be-
cause directors require broad discretion when dealing in areas in which they have
considerable expertise. Broad discretion encourages the development of competent
leadership, and courts should not attempt to dabble in the daily problems involved
with running a corporation."
A second but related rule was developed to apply when corporate management
had an interest in the outcome of its decision. In these cases, courts set aside the
business judgment rule and look behind the board's claims to see if the board's
decision was "intrinsically fair" to the corporation and its shareholders. Thus, the
question arises: Why was the business judgment rule and not the intrinsic fairness test
applied in takeovers?
The explanation is that the first courts to review a board's decision to fight a
tender offer were being asked to decide, as a threshold matter, whether or not they
should even attempt to second-guess the board's decision. At that time the legal arena
had reached no consensus as to what should be the proper response of directors in a
takeover situation. Without a consensus as to what was right, it was hard to judge
whether the directors had acted improperly. The courts also realized that if they chose
the path of second-guessing, it could lead to their having to impose tremendous
damages on individual directors. Because the majority of directors often were not
full-time employees and thus appeared to be disinterested, and because of the intense
judicial reluctance to get involved, the courts uniformly chose an easier solution-the
business judgment rule.
In Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp.,a5 for example, the Second Circuit
was confronted with a case in which the directors were going to lose their jobs
regardless of the outcome of the hostile bid.4 6 Since the directors apparently did not
possess conflicting interests in the outcome of the takeover, the court applied the
business judgment rule to the board's decision to merge with a white knight.47 Also,
in Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.,48 the Seventh Circuit refused to interfere with the
directors' decision when the majority of the directors who voted to oppose a takeover
43. A succinct articulation of the rule was provided by the Delaware Supreme Court in Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien,
280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971):
[A] court will not interfere with the judgment of a board of directors unless there is a showing of gross and
palpable overreaching. A board of directors enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, and its decisions
will not be disturbed if they can be attributed to any rational business purpose. A court under such circumstances
will not substitute its own notions of what is or is not sound business judgment.
Id. at 720 (citation omitted).
44. See generally Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Actions: Viva Zapata?
37 Bus. LAW. 27, 31-33 (1981).
45. 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980).
46. Id. at 383.
47. Id. at 357.
48. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
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attempt were arguably independent, outside directors, again without a conflict of
interest.49 Following these early cases, courts began to feel comfortable applying the
business judgment rule, and the intrinsic fairness test was applied only in the tradi-
tional conflict-of-interest cases.
As the business judgment rule becomes more entrenched in takeover cases,
management will continue to have unlimited discretion in deciding whether and how
to fight. Furthermore, although there is no consensus on the proper role of target
shareholders in the decisionmaking process, 50 the continued use of the business
judgment rule is a decision in itself, a decision to relegate shareholders to a back-seat
position.
B. Impending Problems
As courts apply the business judgment rule to takeover decisions, they will have
to address a few fundamental problems. First, because the business judgment rule did
not evolve in the context of modem takeovers, application of the rule in these cases
raises some significant issues concerning the good faith requirement. The good faith
element of the business judgment rule was originally included to ensure that the rule's
"presumption of validity" would not apply to an officer or director who had engaged
in self-dealing or who had a material personal interest in the outcome of the
transaction. 51 It served as the flow valve that governed whether the business judg-
ment rule or the intrinsic fairness standard would apply. Once a lack of good faith
was shown, the decision was declared suspect and the burden shifted to the officer or
director to show why the transaction was intrinsically fair to the corporation and its
stockholders.
It is clear that when a director receives a commission in a corporate transaction
52
or even collaborates with the corporation in a profit-making transaction, 53 sufficient
doubt is raised about the good faith element to require the director to prove the
transaction's intrinsic fairness. It is not unreasonable to conclude that the decision to
oppose a hostile takeover bid, which directly ensures that an outside director will
continue to receive prestige and compensation as a member of the board, should
receive the same legal treatment. However, decisions to oppose hostile takeover bids
have not received such treatment. The courts began applying the business judgment
rule without analysis in the easy cases and have continued to apply the rule as a
shield, even though directors' continued association with the company is the un-
questionable and intended result of a successful defensive strategy. These courts pay
lip service to the intrinsic fairness test by agreeing to shift the burden to the director if
49. Id. at 294.
50. For an example of the lack of consensus, see Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and
Shareholders" Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733 (1981); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101
(1979); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom; An Update After One Year, 36 Bus. LAW. 1017 (1981).
51. SeeThomas v. Kempner, 398 A.2d 320, 323-24 (Del. Ch. 1979); Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited,
8 HoFTsRA L. REv. 93, 115-16 (1979).
52. See, e.g., Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418 F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Chasin v. Gluck, 282 A.2d 188 (Del. Ch.
1971).
53. See, e.g., Burg v. Hom, 380 F.2d 897 (2d Cir. 1967); Guth v. Loft, Inc., 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (1939).
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the plaintiff can prove that the director's "sole or primary purpose" underlying a
defensive manuever was to retain control. 54 Only when the plaintiff has met this
burden will the defendant be required to show that the transaction also had a valid
corporate purpose.
It is thus fair to conclude, at least with respect to cases representing the legal
mainstream on the business judgment rule (such as Marshall Field5 5 and
Trueblood56), that courts in effect have ignored the good faith element. The analysis
has shifted almost exclusively to an inquiry of whether "any rational business pur-
pose" existed for the decision. Yet merely to articulate the existence of "any rational
business purpose" as a legal test raises suspicions about its adequacy.
The rational business purpose standard almost always can be met by a board's
claim that the bidder's opening price is too low and that room must be left to negotiate
a better deal. 7 If this "business purpose" will not suffice, shareholder groups with
conflicting interests (for example, short-term versus long-term investors) will virtual-
ly assure that some business purpose is served. 58 The practical result is that a corpora-
tion, particularly one advised by knowledgable counsel, will rarely be unable to
devise a sufficient business purpose for its conduct to pass legal muster.59 Judge
Cudahy pointed this out in his dissent in Marshall Field. He criticized the majority
for adopting "an approach which would virtually immunize a target company's board
of directors against liability to shareholders, provided a sufficiently prestigious (and
expensive) array of legal and financial talent were retained to furnish post hoc ration-
ales for fixed and immutable policies of resistance to takeover. "60
More restrictive formulations of the rule provide only partial solutions to the
problems presented by the good faith element. Some judges would interpret the rule
to shift the burden of proof once a plaintiff shows that the desire to retain control was
a motive in the particular business decision being challenged. 61 Judge Cudahy, again,
is a good example. In espousing this middle standard, Judge Cudahy saw a bright line
between decisions involving management of the business enterprise and decisions
involving change of control. "The former involves corporate functioning in competi-
tive business affairs in which judicial interference may be undesirable. The latter
involves only the corporation-shareholder relationship, in which the courts may jus-
tifiably intervene to insist on equitable behavior." 62 Although a more restrictive
formulation is more consistent with the original intent underlying the business judg-
54. Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
55. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
56. 629 F.2d 287 (3rd Cir. 1980), cert. denied. 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
57. See supra text accompanying notes 35-37.
58. See, e.g., Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973); Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th
Cir. 1972).
59. Cohn, Tender Offers and the Sale of Control: An Analogue to Determine the Validity of Target Management
Defensive Measures, 66 IowA L. REV. 475, 499-500 (1981).
60. 646 F.2d 271, 299 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
61. See, e.g., id. at 304 (Cudahy, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 301 (3d Cir. 1980) (Rosenn,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981).
62. 646 F.2d 271, 299-300 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (citing Note, Protection for Shareholder Interests in
Recapitalizations of Publicly Held Corporations, 58 COLUM. L. Rav. 1030, 1066 (1958)), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981).
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ment rule, it nevertheless raises its own difficulties by forcing courts to distill the
subjective intentions of the directors and officers.
The problem could be that we just do not know enough about the decision-
making process in the boardroom. This, coupled with a general lack of consensus on
directors' and shareholders' roles, could explain many of the problems that plague the
area.
V. RECENT JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENT: A FORESHADOWING?
Despite this tremendous hesitation by courts to look behind the actions of direc-
tors in cases involving tender offers, courts are becoming somewhat more suspicious
when directors sit in judgment of each other. A recent series of cases appears to be a
reaction to some of the problems caused by the wholesale application of the business
judgment rule to decisions involving director self-interest.63 These cases address the
extent to which the business judgment rule applies to decisions of the board of
directors to terminate derivative suits that the board has determined are not in the best
interest of the corporation.
The issue is raised by the increasingly popular practice of designating special
committees of disinterested directors to investigate allegations of wrongdoing by
other directors. 64 After several years of avoiding the issue, the Supreme Court of
Delaware rendered the landmark decision of Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado.65 In Zapa-
ta the court recognized that under Delaware law, disinterested directors do in fact
have authority to move to terminate any derivative action, even an action involving
other directors as defendants. Of even greater interest and controversy, however, was
the court's basic rejection of the business judgment rule as the appraisal mechanism
for evaluating a committee's decison. The court interposed a new two-step test for
reviewing a committee's decision. The first step includes a review of the traditional
business judgment rule factors such as the independence and good faith of the di-
rectors. 6 6 The Zapata ruling places the burden of proof on the directors, however,
rather than on the challengers.
If the directors meet the requirements of step one, the court may then exercise its
own "independent business judgement" to decide whether it believes the action
should be dismissed.67 This two-step test seems to be a hybrid of the traditional
business judgment rule and the "intrinsic fairness" test applied to self-dealing trans-
actions.
If the courts can distinguish between board decisions involving management of a
business enterprise and those involving evaluation of directors, they should also be
able to distinguish decisions involving changes in control. Similarly, if courts are
able to determine the reasonableness of directors' actions towards others, they should
63. See Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); see also Watts v. Des Moines Register & Tribune,
525 F. Supp. 1311 (S.D. Iowa 1981); Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco, 495 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Va. 1980), rev'd, 546
F. Supp. 795 (E.D. Va. 1982) (Merhige, J., reversing his earlier decision on the motion to terminate).
64. See generally Block & Prussin, supra note 44, at 29-31, 45-52.
65. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
66. Id. at 788-89.
67. Id.
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be able to evaluate a board's decisions to pour the wealth of the company into a
takeover fight. 68 They should, in short, take the dilemma by the horns and wrestle
with it.
VI. CONCLUSION
The area of tender offer regulation is in need of a drastic reorganization. The
bulk of regulation in this area is provided by a state law concept that grew up in an era
when tender offers were rare and their abuses unknown. Today, tender offers have
become the number one preferred acquisition technique. As the competition for
attractive targets has increased, target management has developed innovative defen-
sive techniques designed to defeat those bids. The practical result of applying the
business judgment rule to evaluate the targets' actions is almost invariably a form of
judicial abstention.
The confusion in this area is highlighted by the fact that, although courts are
willing to trust directors when they vote to fight a tender offer and perpetuate their
board positions, some courts hesitate to trust independent directors' judgments of
other directors. It seems that the opportunity for abuse is at least as great in a decision
to perpetuate one's own position as it is in a judgment of other directors' actions.
To make any progressive change in this area, some hard questions must first be
answered. Without a clear understanding and a unified approach, any change is
almost bound to miss the mark and only add to the current regulatory patchwork. A
sufficient consensus needs to be reached about the steps a board should take when
faced with a hostile bid and the extent to which shareholders should be involved in the
process. Thought must be given to the type of restraints to be imposed on hostile
raiders and why those restraints are better than others. Finally, it must be recognized
that the courts have been applying rules of law developed in one context to the
entirely distinct field of hostile tender offers without an adequate understanding of the
sociology or dynamics of the corporate decisionmaking process.
The SEC Advisory Committee recognized some of these problems and advo-
cated limited changes. Most of the suggestions were well considered. The
recommendation that shareholders cast advisory votes on certain fundamental defen-
sive actions of the board is a good attempt at increasing director responsibility. The
Committee agreed with most shareholders that the currently available methods of
voicing dissent-voting out directors or selling stock-are insufficient.
The Committee failed to address many other problems, however, and thus left
the hard questions for another day. Until these questions are addressed, any change in
the regulation of tender offers will only serve as a temporary patch on what is quickly
becoming a leaky bucket.
68. See Block & Prussin, supra note 44, at 63.
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